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Rwanda is the country with the highest enrolment in health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Pivotal in
setting Rwanda on the path to universal health coverage (UHC) is the community-based health insurance
(CBHI), which covers more than three-quarters of the population. The paper seeks to explain how
Rwanda, one of the poorest countries in the world, managed to achieve such performance by understand-
ing the political drivers behind the CBHI design and implementation. Using an analytical framework rely-
ing on political settlement and ideas, it engages in process-tracing of the critical policy choices of the
CBHI development. The study finds that the commitment to expanding health insurance coverage was
made possible by a dominant political settlement. CBHI is part of the broader efforts of the regime to fos-
ter its legitimacy based on rapid socio-economic development. Yet, CBHI was chosen over other potential
solutions to expand access to healthcare because it was also the option the most compatible with the rul-
ing coalition core ideology.
The study shows that pursuing UHC is an eminently political process but explanations solely based on
objective ‘‘interests” of rulers cannot fully account for the emergence and shape of social protection pro-
gramme. Ideology matters as well. Programme design compatible with the political economy of a country
but incompatible with ideas of the ruling coalition is likely to run into political obstructions. The study
also questions the relevance for poor countries to reach UHC relying on pure CBHI models based on vol-
untary enrolment and community management.
 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Providing affordable healthcare to the population of low and
middle-countries is a persistent development issue. The WHO esti-
mated in 2010 that 100million people are pushed into poverty and
150million suffer financial catastrophe because of out-of-pocket
expenditure on health services every year (WHO, 2010: 8). Conse-
quently, universal health coverage is a priority on the global devel-
opment agenda, as demonstrated by its inclusion in the
Sustainable Development Goals. Despite the global support for uni-
versal health coverage, how to reach this objective in poor coun-
tries remains highly debated (Kutzin, 2012; WHO, 2010).
Rwanda has made impressive strides towards universal health
coverage, mainly by providing health insurance to the poor in
the informal sector through its community-based health insurance
(CBHI), the focus of this article. The scheme, also known by itsFrench name, mutuelles de santé, has made Rwanda the country
with the highest health insurance enrolment in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Table 1). In 2015/2016, the scheme covered 81.6 percent of Rwan-
dans according to the Rwandan Social Security Board (RSSB),1 the
public body managing social security services. Furthermore, an addi-
tional 6 percent working in the formal economy were enrolled in
other health insurance schemes: the RAMA (Rwandaise d’Assurance
Maladie), which covers civil servants, the Military Medical Insurance
(MMI), and private health insurances. These data are consistent with
the findings of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS). In 2014/2015,
while the official CBHI total enrolment was 76.5 percent2, the DHS,
focusing only on respondents aged 15–49, found that 70 percent
were enrolled in the CBHI (NISR, MoH, & ICF International, 2015).3
CBHI in Rwanda has successfully increased medical care utilisation
and decreased out-of-pocket expenses (Lu et al., 2012; Saksena,sites/de-
t 2015).
incentive
Table 1
health insurance enrolment in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Country Coverage Insurance name Year of
reference
Source
Rwanda 81.6% for CBHI. 87%
including other insurances
CBHI (coverage reaches 87% if MMI, RAMA and private insurances are
included)
2015 RSSB
Gabon 45% NHIP (National Health Insurance Program) 2012 Saleh, Barroy, and
Couttolenc (2014)
Ghana 38% NHI (National Health Insurance Scheme) 2013 NHIA (2014)
Senegal 32% Different insurance schemes 2014 Ministère de la Santé et de
l’Action social (n.d.)
Burundi 25% CAM (Carte d’Assurance Maladie) 2012 Ministère de la Santé (2015)
Namibia 18% Different insurance schemes 2014 Abt Associates and USAID
(2014: 7)
Botswana 17% Different medical aid schemes, the biggest being BPOMAS (Botswana Public
Officers’ Medical Aid Scheme)
2013 SHOPS Project (2014)
Kenya 17% NHIF (National Hospital Insurance Fund) covered 15%, private insurance and
CBHI the rest.
2014 MoH of Kenya (2014)
South
Africa
16% Private insurances and different medical schemes 2013 Republic of South Africa
(2014: 61)
Tanzania 10% National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), Social Health Insurance Benefit
(SHIB), Community Health Fund (CHF), Private insurance
2008 Mills, Ally, Goudge, Gyapong,
and Mtei (2012)
Ethiopia 8% CBHI and SHI 2015 Lavers (2016)
Nigeria 3% National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 2013 Dutta and Hongoro (2013)
Lesotho 2% Different insurance schemes 2014 Lesotho 2014 Demographic
health Survey (DHS)
Source: author’s compilation. Countries with the highest health coverage according to ILO Social Security Inquiry were selected but data have been systematically verified. If it
could not, countries have been removed (Gambia, Sudan, Djibouti). Additional countries with low enrolment numbers have been added as a way of illustration. Only the main
insurance names are mentioned.
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2017). The scheme has evolved from a pure form of voluntary CBHI
to one based on obligatory enrolment and subsidies from the formal
sector, thus paving the way to a national health insurance model.
Before the scheme became compulsory in 2006, it was already recog-
nised as one of the rare successes of wide CBHI coverage in Sub-
Saharan Africa (De Allegri, Sauerborn, Kouyaté, & Flessa, 2009;
Soors, Devadasan, Durairaj, & Criel, 2010).
Since the 1990s, CBHI has been widely promoted in poor coun-
tries as a tool to reduce the financial burden of accessing health-
care (Dror & Jacquier, 1999; Preker and Carrin, 2004). CBHI has
three main features: it is based on pre-payments for purchasing
healthcare, separating direct health payment from utilisation, it
is controlled by the community, and it relies on voluntary mem-
bership (Atim, 1998; Hsiao, 2001; Preker et al., 2004).4 CBHI is
one of three main financing strategies to reach universal health cov-
erage. The two others being social health insurance (SHI), which is a
compulsory system gathering resources for healthcare from
employee payroll taxes and managed by a public or quasi-public
organisation, and tax-based financing, whereby money is collected
through general taxation of the entire population and finances
healthcare through the general government budget.
CBHI seems a particularly suitable solution to improve access to
health services in low- and middle-income countries where the
size of the formal sector is small, preventing payroll deduction
for social health insurance, and the creation of a tax-base robust
enough to finance universal health coverage. Yet, despite the global
interest in CBHI, population enrolment in these schemes remains
stubbornly low in poor countries, and especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Appiah, 2012; De Allegri et al., 2009; Ndiaye, Soors, &
Criel, 2007; Odeyemi, 2014; Soors et al., 2010), making Rwanda a
conspicuous exception.
Despite the importance of the Rwandan case to inform the
debate about achieving universal health coverage in poor coun-
tries, the literature remains focused on the scheme’s technical4 For simplicity’s sake, the Rwanda scheme will be referred as ‘CBHI’ throughout
the article, although the scheme was not a pure form of CBHI from 2006 onwards,
when it became compulsory.and managerial aspects (e.g., Musango, 2005; Lu et al., 2012;
Saksena et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2017). While social protection
involves shifting resource allocation and is consequently an emi-
nently political process (Graham, 1995; Barrientos & Pellissery,
2012), analyses of the history and politics behind the Rwandan
impressive CBHI expansion are so far absent. This is especially sur-
prising as the scheme features highly original and polarising char-
acteristics, such as compulsory enrolment, public and private
subsidisation, and massive donors’ funding. This raises questions
about the origins of such innovations, the kinds of ideas that sup-
ported them, and the lessons that can be drawn from this experi-
ence. This article contributes to filling this gap. By analysing the
politics and ideas behind the adoption and implementation of
the CBHI, it seeks to understand why the policy took the shape that
it did in Rwanda, and why it was successful at being scaled-up.
The study constructs a historical narrative of the scheme, using
process tracing of the crucial decisions that gave the CBHI its cur-
rent form. Process-tracing can be defined as the investigation of
the ‘‘decision process by which various initial conditions are trans-
lated into outcomes” (George & McKeown, 1985: 35). Analysis
based on process-tracing often requires detailed historical analysis.
This ensures the validity of the causal mechanism identified, while
ruling out possible alternative hypotheses (George & Bennett,
2004: 205–232). Sources of data include review of policy docu-
ments and semi-structured interviews. The paper draws on a wider
research on state effectiveness in Rwanda which involved a nine-
month fieldwork conducted in 2012 and 2013, and included more
than 150 interviews. Another fieldwork between January and
March 2015 was the occasion to conduct further interviews. They
include interviews of high-level politicians (eight interviews,
including interviews of four former ministers of health), govern-
mental technical staff within government, mainly from the Min-
istry of Health (16 interviews), staff from international
organisations involved in the CBHI design, funding and implemen-
tation (five interviews).
The article first introduces the theoretical framework guiding
this study. It then presents a historical narrative of the policy-
making process with respect to CBHI in Rwanda, concentrating
on critical policy choices. Using the theoretical framework, it then
B. Chemouni /World Development 106 (2018) 87–98 89moves to an analysis of the political drivers and ideas behind the
CBHI design and implementation. The conclusion highlights what
lessons can be drawn from the Rwandan case to pursue universal
health coverage in poor countries.2. Analysing the politics of health coverage: Political
settlements and ideas
The analysis draws on the theoretical framework developed by
Lavers and Hickey (2015), which relies on two pillars. First, recog-
nising the centrality of bargaining and contention between political
groups in the evolution of social policies in advanced economies
(Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1978), the framework uses a polit-
ical settlement approach to analyse the political drivers of social
protection. Political settlement can be defined as ‘the balance or
distribution of power between contending social groups and social
classes’ (DiJohn and Putzel, 2009: 4). Identifying the different social
groups and their relative power helps in understanding the institu-
tional structure that underpins the distribution of rents under the
form of social protection policies. This is because political settle-
ments directly influence institutions, since ‘if powerful groups are
not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institu-
tional structure, they will strive to change it’ (Khan, 2010: 4).
Drawing on Khan (2010), horizontal (between elite factions)
and vertical (between the elite and the population) distribution
of power can be distinguished. As hypothesised by Lavers and
Hickey (2015: 10–11), in a competitive political settlement where
elite factions excluded from the ruling coalition are powerful and
where the ruling coalition has little autonomy from its supporters
and the population in general, social protection programmes are
more likely to derail. Rulers have an incentive to turn them into
clientelist channels of redistribution and sites of rent capture to
accommodate the powerful opposition or reinforce the loyalty of
their supporters. Implementation of social programmes might also
suffer because ‘‘the more powerful lower level factions become, the
greater the number of points at which the enforcement of particu-
lar rules can be blocked” (Khan, 2010: 65). Conversely, in a domi-
nant settlement where power is concentrated both horizontally
and vertically, social programmes are more likely to be functional
and impartially implemented. In addition, implementation benefits
from the higher enforcement capacities of the coalition. Conse-
quently, in a dominant settlement, rulers are likely to feel secure,
reason in a longer-term perspective and expand social protection
as a means of legitimation to prevent the emergence of political
opposition.
In Rwanda, the political settlement can best be described as a
dominant settlement. Power is concentrated in the hands of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was created by Tutsi refu-
gees who fled the anti-Tutsi pogroms of the 1950s and 1960s. It
was formed in Uganda in 1987 with the objective of allowing the
return of refugees to Rwanda, which the two Hutu-dominated
regimes since independence have constantly opposed (Prunier,
1998: 35–90). The RPF launched an attack from Uganda in 1990,
and gained power in 1994 by stopping the genocide against the
Tutsi ethnic group and achieving a clear victory over the govern-
mental army. It gained power in a context of limited popular sup-
port. The Rwandan population is thought to be composed of
roughly 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. The Tutsi-led RPF ended
the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group and has ruled over a
Hutu-dominated population. Such ethnic discrepancy was magni-
fied by the horrors of the genocide and decades of anti-Tutsi ideol-
ogy that constituted a central criterion of legitimacy of all regimes
since independence (Prunier, 1998).
Since the end of the genocide, power is horizontally concen-
trated in Rwanda because the political opposition is virtually inex-istent for two main reasons. First, from 1994 onwards, the RPF has
made sure to give a minimum representation in government to
other legally-recognised political parties. This practice was later
enshrined in the 2003 constitution, which provides that the dom-
inant party in parliament (which has always been the RPF) cannot
have more than 50 percent of ministerial portfolios. Yet, this
arrangement does not reflect the reality of power. Power remains
firmly entrenched in the RPF, helped by its control of the military
apparatus, and supported by a range of military and party-owned
large enterprises (Gökgür, 2012; Reyntjens, 2013). Second, the
closed political space, and the limits put on media and civil society
activities (Beswick, 2010; Reyntjens, 2013), prevent the emergence
of alternative political ideas and projects. As a result, the political
opposition is weak. It is mainly outside Rwanda, constituted by
diaspora activists and the remnants of the armed opposition to
the RPF that flew into the Democratic Republic of Congo after the
genocide.
Power is also vertically concentrated in the settlement. The RPF
is generally analysed as a cohesive party, although this cohesive-
ness has been punctually challenged by the defection of high-
level individuals. It is dominated by Paul Kagame who enjoys enor-
mous loyalty from party supporters. The RPF has a considerable
autonomy from subordinate groups, giving it great enforcement
capabilities. These capabilities are enhanced by the RPF’s tight con-
trol of the local administration (Chemouni, 2014).
The second pillar of the theoretical framework recognises the
importance of ideas in analysing social policy. One limit of the
political settlement analysis is its inherent reliance on interest-
based explanations (Lavers & Hickey, 2015). Institutions are con-
ceptualised as mere reflection of the underlying distribution of
power. Ideas are treated at best as instruments used by elites to
reach their objectives. Yet, this reductive approach to political
behaviour is questionable, especially in the case of social policy.
It ignores that a significant scholarship has identified ideas as
instrumental in shaping preferences in social policy (Béland,
2005; Schmidt, 2002). Furthermore, social policy programmes
can be the result of ideational transfer from abroad. Weyland
(2009) argues that they are mainly the result of cognitive shortcuts
to make easier the process of policy-making. Finally, ideas matter
because the exclusive use of a political settlement framework
ignores the fact that ‘‘any political settlement is likely to be com-
patible with several different policy approaches” (Lavers &
Hickey, 2015: 11).
To analyse the role of ideas in social protection, it is useful to
distinguish between policy paradigms, i.e., mental road maps pro-
viding ‘‘a relatively coherent set of assumptions about the func-
tioning of economic, social and political institutions” (Béland,
2005: 8), problem definitions, i.e., a way of framing and under-
standing particular social issues, and finally policy ideas, which
provide potential solutions to pre-defined social problems. Analy-
sis also distinguishes between cognitive ideas, used to understand
reality and how to act on it, and normative ideas that ‘indicate
‘‘what is good or bad about what is” in light of ‘‘what one ought
to do”’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306, in Lavers & Hickey, 2015). This overall
framework, focusing on the crossroads of interests and ideas, is
used to analyse the empirical material presented in the next
section.3. CBHI: The quest for universal health coverage
3.1. Recognising the problem
Since the 1960s, patients have paid user fees for healthcare ser-
vices in Rwanda. At the beginning symbolic, they increased dra-
matically in the early 1990s, following the 1987 Bamako African
90 B. Chemouni /World Development 106 (2018) 87–98health ministers’ initiative, which called for cost recovery.
Immediately after the genocide, healthcare became free. This was
not due to the government’s ideological preferences, but was a
pragmatic decision in the context of the post-genocide emergency
period. The few state-run health facilities still functioning provided
poor quality emergency care to an impoverished population unable
to pay for healthcare services. Furthermore, the health sector
mainly consisted of an aggregation of NGOs that provided free
healthcare.
User fees were progressively re-introduced in 1997, because of
budgetary constraints. They resulted in a drop in the utilisation of
health facilities (Fig. 1 below). Furthermore, donors’ assistance to
the health sector progressively decreased as a result of the end of
the emergency period (1994–98). This spurred the Ministry of
Health (MoH) in 1998 to ask USAID for help to improve financial
access to healthcare through health insurance. USAID readily
agreed, as the request fitted with their existing Partnerships for
Health Reform (PHR) project, a global five-year project which
began in October 1995 to support health sector reform. In 1998,
the consultancy firm Abt Associates, financed by the PHR, assisted
the ministry in the design, implementation and evaluation of a
pilot project.
During this period, rendering access to healthcare partially or
totally free was never contemplated, despite some NGOs advocat-
ing for such a solution.5 The lack of resources made it hard to con-
sider free healthcare (i.e., based on general taxation and donors’
support), as confirmed by the results of the 1998 National Health
Account (Schneider et al., 2000b). Besides the financial constraints,
lifting user fees was also ruled out for ideological reasons. The Rwan-
dan leadership worried that it would open the door to a culture of
assistance and dependency. As put by the then minister of health
(1994–1997), Joseph Karemera, pre-payment schemes were already
‘appealing to [him] because [they] created solidarity, ownership and
self-reliance’.6 The 1995 Rwandan Health Policy consequently
encouraged the population to create CBHI schemes and self-help
mechanisms to increase financial access to healthcare (Schneider,
Diop, & Bucyana, 2000a: 16).7 Interview former minister of health, Kigali, 29 January 2015; with Joseph
Karemera, Kigali, 28 January 2015; with international consultant by phone, 28 July
2015.
8 Mary Baines, senior cadres and historical figure of the RPF, was apparently
instrumental in attracting the attention of the party on the Ruhondo scheme
(interview with Protais Musoni, Kigali, 20 February 2015). See also interview with a3.2. Devising a solution: The 1999 CBHI pilot
The pilot’s design was shaped by three main factors. First, no
existing African examples of pre-payment schemes stood out as
having the potential to be directly translated into the Rwandan sit-
uation. Already in 1995, the MoH examined West African
community-based schemes and the Burundian Assistance Health
Card (CAM), a national health insurance scheme created in 1984.
They were not considered as potential models as their results were
deemed unsatisfactory, notably in terms of enrolment. The CBHI
pilot design was however influenced by the experience of an Abt
consultant who worked on pre-payment schemes tested at the
time in Zambia. Individuals enrolled in these schemes paid a
monthly sum to a health facility in exchange for free services when
the person fell sick.
The second influence lies in the ideological preference of the
MoH to involve the community in the management of the scheme.
It was a key difference with the Zambian scheme where health
facility staff managed the funds. The intent of the MoH was to pro-
mote two kinds of participation: grassroots democratic participa-
tion, by increasing the population’s oversight in the management
and use of funds; and financial participation to avoid the popula-
tion being passive consumers not ‘owning’ the scheme or not5 Interview with Joseph Karemera, former minister of health Kigali, 28 January
2015 and MoH high official, Kigali, 19 February 2015.
6 Interview, Kigali, 28 January 2015.taking responsibility for it because, as stated by Joseph Karemera,
former minister of health, ‘free things are not put to proper use’.7
The third influence on the design of the pilot came from consul-
tations with the grassroots level. The scheme’s features –benefit
package, premium and co-payment levels, management structure–
were based on the pilot steering committee’s consultation of the
population, health staff and local leaders. Fact sheets laying out
the advantages and disadvantages of each design option were sub-
mitted locally for discussion during several consultative work-
shops held from February 1999 to July 1999.
Past initiatives aiming at decreasing the financial burden of
healthcare on citizens in Rwanda hardly influenced the CBHI
pilots. Solidarity funds, used to mitigate out-of-pocket expendi-
ture for unplanned events such as illness or funerals, have existed
since colonial times (Nzisabira, 1992). Six existed in 1998
(MoH, 2004: 5), often organised around church-run health facili-
ties, but encountered significant operational issues. An exception
was a scheme created by the bourgmestre of the commune of
Ruhondo in the North of the country, which achieved a significant
enrolment rate. As recalled by Protais Musoni, former Minister of
Local Government (2004–09), this initiative ‘created lots of
enthusiasm in the leadership’ of the RPF.8 Yet, this initiative did
not influence the pilot because it was deemed not participatory
enough, as it was essentially a local tax for healthcare.
Another potential influence on the pilot could have come from
the Social Democratic Party (PSD), since CBHI featured in its 1991
political programme. Yet, no direct link between the PSD pro-
gramme and the CBHI seems to exist (cf. Golooba-Mutebi, 2013:
19). Many of the key policy-makers at the time, including Protais
Musoni and Joseph Karemera, simply did not know that the PSD
includedmutuelles in its programme.9 In addition, although two for-
mer healthministers, Vincent Biruta (in office from1997 to 1999) and
Jean-DamascèneNtawukuriryayo (2004–08),were from the PSD, they
both denied a link between the PSD idea and the 1999 pilot.10
The rollout of the pilot occurred in 3 health districts (Schneider,
Diop, & Bucyana, 2000). Sensitisation campaigns began in February
1999, only three months after the start of the project, and the pilot
was eventually launched on 1 July 1999. It was a success. In only a
year and a half, 8 percent of the population in the pilot districts had
enrolled. The scheme increased health facility utilisation and
decreased out-of-pocket expenses, although many poor remained
excluded from the scheme because premiums were too expensive
for them (Schneider & Diop, 2001). These results convinced the
MoH to roll out CBHI nationwide. It also created demands from
other health districts for similar pre-payment schemes.3.3. Expansion and consolidation: Toward national coverage
One crucial finding of the pilot, in line with the commune-led
experience in Ruhondo before 1999, was that involvement of local
government officials to sensitise the population is vital to stimu-
late enrolment. Consequently, the Rwandan government made
local officials the mainstay of the expansion of the CBHI schemes.
In 2003, MINALOC instructed province governors and district may-
ors to create mutuelles ‘as quickly as possible’ and stated that ‘theformer minister of health, Kigali, 29 January 2015.
9 Interview with Joseph Karemera, Kigali, 28 January 2015; with Protais Musoni,
Kigali, 20 February 2015; with former minister of health, Kigali, 29 January 2015.
10 Interview with Vincent Biruta, Kigali, 19 February 2015; with Jean Damascène
Ntawukuriryayo 23 January 2015.
Fig. 1. Proportion of population covered by health insurance and health facility utilisation in Rwanda. Source: MoH and RSSB data. For health insurance enrolment from 2011
on, the years are fiscal and not calendar years (e.g., 2011 is 2011/2012).
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tion’ (Musango, Doetinchem, & Carrin, 2009: 6).11 CBHI schemes
developed rapidly as a consequence. There were 54 in 2000, 76 in
2001, and 226 in 2004 (MoH, 2004: 4; Soors et al., 2010: 42). As a
result, the trend of decreasing utilisation of health facilities since
the introduction of user fees was reversed (Fig. 1).
In parallel, CBHI attracted the attention of the top leadership.
Presidential advisors regularly consulted the MoH to enquire about
its last developments. It became a national priority: CBHI was inte-
grated into the 2002 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). It
consequently benefited from the support of the whole executive
branch of the government. Concretely, as recalled by a consultant
who worked regularly on the CBHI from 1999 to 2011, ‘‘the min-
istry [of health] never had to demand resources to scale up the
mutuelles. It is rather the presidency or the ministry of finance that
made the budget available to the ministry”.12
Nonetheless, the CBHI schemes remained a collection of patchy
interventions initiated by different actors (churches, local govern-
ments, opinion leaders) with variation in the organisation, the care
package and the amount of the premium and co-payments. Inter-
ventions at hospitals were not covered (MoH, 2004: 7). Recognis-
ing both the good results of the CBHI and their limits, the
government laid out a series of principles in the 2004 Mutuelles
Development Policy. Subscriptions were standardised at 1000
RwF (1.7USD at the time) per person per year, although some
donors argued that it was too high.13 At this rate, however, relying
only on population contribution was not sustainable. Furthermore,
the scheme remained unaffordable for the poorest, which decreased
the equity and limited its expansion. Consequently, the 2004 policy
stated that ‘a national solidarity mechanism between the formal
public and private salaried sector and the rural world should be
put in place’ (MoH, 2004: 17)14, laying the basis for the subsidising
of the CBHI by the formal sector. The policy also recognised the need
for the government to support the CBHI schemes financially and
subsidise them for the poorest.11 Author’s translation from the French.
12 Interview by phone, 28 July 2015; see also interview with Maurice Bucagu,
Geneva, 23 February 2015.
13 Interview with CCM member, Kigali, 20 January 2015, with Jean Damascène
Ntawukuriryayo 23 January 2015; with former donor through phone, 20 March 2015.
14 Author’s translation from the French.This commitment, apparently difficult to implement in the
short run given its cost, materialised in 2006 thanks to funding
from the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM). The previous year, the Country Coordinating Mechanism
(CCM) team for GFATM-funded projects in the MoH, composed of
MoH and donors’ staff, had submitted an innovative application
to a GFATM call for proposal. Instead of asking for funding for ver-
tical interventions on particular diseases, the CCM successfully
applied for funds to subsidise the CBHI for the poorest under the
form of a ‘Health System Strengthening’ project. It became at the
time one of only three ‘Health System Strengthening’ projects ever
approved by GFATM (Kalk, Groos, Karasi, & Girrbach, 2010). The
Global Fund accepted this unconventional project because the
CCM argued convincingly that to effectively fight the diseases on
which the GFATM focused (HIV, tuberculosis and malaria), finan-
cial access to healthcare for the poorest had to be improved. In Jan-
uary 2006, $34 million were made available to the CBHI for the
next five years (Kalk et al., 2010).
The success of the application came as a surprise and created
tensions between donors and the MoH. Initially, as laid out in
the proposal, a consortium composed of the German cooperation
GTZ, UNDP and the Rwandan first lady’s Protection and Care of
Families against AIDS (PACFA) were to manage the money (CCM
Rwanda, 2005: 15). When the grant submission proved successful,
however, the MoH decided against the consortium, in order to
manage most of the funding by itself. The rationale was to
strengthen national capacity, and to limit overhead costs of the
members of the Consortium (Kalavakonda, Groos, & Karasi, 2007:
18). On the donors’ side, concerns were raised about the capacity
of the MoH to manage the money and implement the project.15
Despite frictions, the MoH did not change its position and, as a con-
sequence, UNDP withdrew from the process, while GTZ was only
awarded about 1 percent of the total budget.
The award of the grant had two main consequences for the
CBHI. First, by paying the membership fees for 1.57million
Rwandans and the co-payments for 1.35millions of them (Kalk
et al., 2010: 95), it boosted the CBHI coverage dramatically and
increased equity in accessing healthcare. Yet, 14 percent of the
poorest Rwandans still had to pay the co-payment when seeking15 Interview with CCM member, Kigali, 20 January 2015; with former donor through
phone, 20 March 2015; with former MoH top official, Kigali, 23 March 2015.
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ing also created a precedent as GFATM provided further funding in
subsequent grants. Second, the grant made mandatory health
insurance enrolment enforceable, a measure impossible to imple-
ment without subsidising the CBHI for the poorest.
3.3.1. Making CBHI enrolment compulsory
The decision to make the CBHI compulsory was taken by minis-
terial order in 2006. It was subsequently enshrined in the 2007
CBHI Law that states that ‘every personwho resides in Rwanda shall
be obliged to join the mutual health insurance scheme’.16 The need
to justify local officials’ heavy-handed practices to boost enrolment
explains why the mandatory nature of the CBHI was specified in a
ministerial order instead of waiting for the law to be passed.17
Four main factors explain why the bold and polarising decision
of making health insurance enrolment mandatory was taken. First,
Jean-Damascène Ntawukuriryayo, who had been minister of health
since September 2004, was frustrated by the slow progress of CBHI
enrolment. Second, it was clear to the MoH that low enrolment
jeopardised the scheme’s financial sustainability, notably through
adverse selection, with people in good health less likely to enrol
(MoH, 2004: 9). Third, Minister Ntawukuriryayo had been inspired
by his experience as a student in Belgium, where health insurance
was mandatory.18 Finally, the GFATM grant subsidising health
insurance for the poorest meant that compulsory enrolment for
everyone could materialise.
Mandatory enrolment was supported unanimously in govern-
ment and parliament and the 2007 CBHI law was easily passed.
Many donors however were opposed to compulsory enrolment,
which they considered too authoritarian. Yet, the MoH did not
change its stance. As recalled by the minister of health of the time,
Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo:
I had to fight with the Americans, the Germans, the Belgians, all
those that were involved in the mutuelles because I was com-
pletely changing the original concept [of voluntary enrolment]
and they were not expecting that.19
Mandatory financial participation was not only a policy choice,
but also a matter of principle. For instance, even when a donor
could pay for the whole population in a given region, the MoH
refused. As explained by Ntawukuriryayo:
MSF [Doctors without Borders] Belgium who was operating in
the North, in Burera, [. . .] wanted to pay the mutuelles to every-
one. I told them that [this] was strange, since all these people
were not indigent. One has to pay only for the people in need.
It becameabig deal [. . .] I told them they should not take our peo-
ple hostage, not get them used to being fed, and when they [the
donors] are going to leave, they will let them with nothing.20
More generally, donors regularly put the question of lifting user
fees – partially or totally – back on the table, invoking notably the
examples of Uganda. By the time of the CBHI scale-up, the global
ideological context regarding user fees had shifted. Whereas in
the late 1990s, user fees coupled with pre-payment schemes were
not questioned, the push for lifting them became en vogue in the
mid-2000s, in the wake of the poverty-reduction strategies (Ridde,16 Article 33, Law N 62/2007 of 30 December 2007 Establishing and Determining
the Organisation, Functioning and Management of the Mutual Health Insurance
Scheme. In practice, individuals that already subscribed to a health insurance often
did not have to join the CBHI.
17 Interview with international consultant by phone, 28 July 2015.
18 Interview with Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo 23 January 2015.
19 Interview, Kigali, 14 January 2014, translated from French by the author.
20 Interview, Kigali, 14 January 2014, translated from French by the author.Robert, & Meessen, 2010). The Rwandan government has always
categorically refused to consider lifting user fees, a measure consid-
ered unsustainable and thatwould foster dependency on foreign aid
in the long run.21 As explained by Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo:
My approach was to say that I don’t want anything for free [. . .],
if there is always somebody to give me things for free, at any
time this person can decide to stop. If she stops, what happens
to me? [. . .] To me and my government, it is about taking our
responsibilities: not always await that you give me something
and I take it. [. . .] That is why we chose the mutuelles.22
The refusal to lift user fees and the decision to make enrolment
mandatory has clear roots in the RPF ideology, already visible in
the discussion surrounding the 1999 pilots. First, mandatory enrol-
ment has been anchored in the ideological importance for the RPF
of kwigira, relying only on oneself. Undoubtedly, the CBHI is depen-
dent on donor funding, but the idea was to create a system that in
the long run could decrease this dependency. This is because
dependency was seen as dangerous for the country. Second,
mandatory financial participation has been justified ideologically
because, according to the RPF, no one should get anything for free,
i.e., with no visible act of payment. As explained by former minister
Joseph Karemera, the RPF ‘doesn’t believe in people being only
recipients’ because ‘free things destroy the mentality of the peo-
ple’.23 Overall, as summarised by another former Minister of Health,
Vincent Biruta, compulsory CBHI was also ‘a manner to work on
mentalities. What matters is the contribution’.24
3.3.2. Ongoing issues and professionalisation of the scheme
The rapid expansion of CBHI in Rwanda created many difficul-
ties. Managerial capacities of the staff, although improving, were
limited. The auditing capacity of the MoH had been low, which cre-
ated important opportunities for overbilling by health facilities
(OAG, 2011). Furthermore, high enrolment has been difficult to
maintain, as demonstrated by the recent decrease of CBHI subscrip-
tion (Fig. 1). Several factors have been raised to explain it. Enrol-
ment numbers have been inflated by some local officials, as
uncovered by a governmental audit, and were corrected.25 Effort
of mobilisation might also have been lower than before, partly
because of the priority given to local economic development as part
of Second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
(EDPRS 2) adopted in 2013.Without continuous efforts from the local
officials to ensure yearly renewal ofmutuelle subscription, the endur-
ingly high level of CBHI premiums and the improving, yet limited,
quality of healthcare hindered spontaneous voluntary enrolment.
Efforts by the government to tackle these issues have led to the
decline of the mutuelles’ community-based character and the
increased professionalization of its management. The 2007 CBHI
Law, for instance, did not retain the management model proposed
in the 2004 policy, which largely involved the community in the
national institutions managing CBHI. At district level, members of
the board of directors of the mutual health insurance fund were
all appointed by ministerial order. As a consequence, the WHO
noted that ‘this limited representation of mutuelles members is
unlikely to promote the feeling of community ownership of the
schemes’ (WHO, 2009: 61). Similarly, the national audit committee
included no member from civil society.21 Interview with former MoH official, Kigali, 9 January/2014.
22 Interview, Kigali, 14 January 2014.
23 Interview with Joseph Karemera, Kigali, 28 January 2015; similar point in
interview with former MoH top officials, Kigali, 19 February 2015, with former
minister of health, 29 January 2015.
24 Interview in Kigali, 19 February 2015.
25 ‘How probe uncovered the rot in ‘‘Mutuelle de Sante”’, The New Times, 3 February
2015.
26 Respectively, articles 63 and 25 of the 2007 and 2015 CBHI Laws.
27 Interview with district vice-mayor, 12 June 2013. See also ‘Locked out of market
over mutuelle cards’, The New Times, 28 February 2007; ‘Rwanda: No one should be
forced to pay mutuelle – premier’. Rwanda Focus, 15 February 2013.
28 Interview with MoH official, Kigali, 16 January 2014.
29 Interview with district high official, 12 June 2013, translated from French by the
author.
30 ‘How probe uncovered the rot in ‘‘Mutuelle de Sante”’, The New Times, 3 February
2015.
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the 2015 CBHI Law. In 2014, the government leadership retreat
decided that the Rwandan Social Security Board (RSSB) would
manage the CBHI. The rational was that, as the management body
for pensions and civil servants’ health insurance, RSSB had a better
experience in fund management than the MoH. The arrangement
also created economies of scale, eased auditing and increased
risk-pooling by centralising the funds in RSSB, instead of money
being partly managed in each CBHI branch. Consequently, as a
result of constant efforts of the government to streamline the CBHI
functioning and prevent mismanagement, the scheme gradually
lost its ethos of popular ownership.
3.3.3. Attempt to increase equity and financial sustainability
Another issue for CBHI since its creation lies in its financial sus-
tainability and equity. In 2007, when themutuelles law was passed,
the CBHI was financially balanced at district level, but ran alarming
deficits at hospital level (WHO, 2009: 71). Moreover, the scheme’s
fairness was questionable. The flat rate premium of 1000 RwF per
individual benefited the wealthiest (WHO, 2009: 67).
As a consequence, the MoH adopted two measures. First, it cre-
ated in 2009 a National Guarantee Fund to financially support
CBHI. The fund was financed by the MoH, contributing to 13 per-
cent of its ordinary budget, and by grants equivalent to 1 percent
of the income from all health insurance companies in the country.
Second, the MoH adopted the principle of stratification of premi-
ums according to beneficiaries’ wealth in its 2010 CBHI policy.
The goal was to make CBHI subscription progressive while max-
imising resources mobilisation. Premium stratification according
to wealth is difficult, since the population enrolled in the CBHI
mainly works in the informal sector. The MoH decided to rely on
a wealth classification exercise regularly carried out since 2001
for the ubudehe programme. Ubudehe is a social protection pro-
gramme under the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment that involves the classification by community of
households according to their wealth, in order to differentiate
social interventions. The MoH harnessed this initiative to modulate
the premium of the mutuelles. As a result, 24.8 percent of the pop-
ulation was classified as indigent (category 1) for whom mutuelles
fees of 2000 RwF were paid by the state and donors. People in cat-
egory 2 (65.9 percent) paid 3000 RwF/person, and the richer in cat-
egory 3 (0.64 percent) 7000 RwF/person.
The accuracy of this classification process has been questioned.
Evidence indicates its lack of participatory and transparent charac-
ter (Gaynor, 2014: S53–54; Sabates-Wheeler, Yates, Wylde, &
Gatsinzi, 2015). Especially worrying was the absence of correspon-
dence between households’ categorisation in ubudehe and the
results of the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 3
(EICV 3), which measures household consumption (Sabates-
Wheeler et al., 2015). This may indicate that local authorities
decide arbitrarily who gets mutuelles subscription for free, along
with plenty of other benefits associated with the lowest ubudehe
category. Yet, while elite capture might occur at the local level,
there is no evidence that it is the result of a systematic, centrally
devised strategy of patronage. On the contrary, the central govern-
ment displayed commitment to solving the issue. It publicly recog-
nised the problem during the 2014 leadership retreat, which
resulted in pressure on MINALOC to devise a new classification
for ubudehe. In addition, the community classification exercise
was complemented by a household questionnaire to provide more
objective measures of poverty (Lavers, 2016a).
3.3.4. Day-to-day implementation
Exploring the policy design of the CBHI is not enough to explain
the dramatic enrolment in the scheme. For example, although
enrolment in health insurance is also mandatory in Ghana, as inRwanda, it is a mere declaration of intent (e.g., Jehu-Appiah
et al., 2011: 158; Kusi, Enemark, Hansen, & Asante 2015, Table 1
above). Analysis of the CBHI expansion in Rwanda consequently
requires understanding the role of the local bureaucracy in main-
taining high enrolment rates.
Enrolment has been first facilitated by the numerous sensitisa-
tion channels at the disposition of the national and local
governments. This includes official speeches following the state-
organised, monthly community work umuganda, community radio,
churches, markets, cooperatives or women associations. In
addition, the tight networks of 45,000 community health workers
operating in each of the 14,744 villages (umudugudu) of Rwanda,
are crucial for sensitisation and detection of individuals who did
not pay themutuelles. In other words, the high degree of the state’s
‘‘infrastructural power” (Mann, 1984) through dense, decentralised
administrative structure, numerous channels of information, and a
tight network of community health workers, was significant in
ensuring high enrolment.
Yet, what pushes local officials to use the powerful tool that the
Rwandan local state machinery constitutes? The answer lies
mainly in the strong pressure applied on local governments. As
mentioned above, as early as 2002, mutuelles enrolment was part
of local government evaluation. Currently, the most conspicuous
pressure comes from the imihigo system, or performance contracts,
solemnly signed annually since 2006 between district mayors and
the President (Chemouni, 2014). CBHI enrolment always features
as an objective in those contracts. The target is invariably of 100
percent membership across all districts, whereas other targets in
imihigo are usually adapted according to the districts’ situation,
which reveals the government’s commitment to quickly reach uni-
versal health coverage. Officials can also rely on a conducive legal
framework to boost enrolment. The 2007 and 2015 CBHI Law
allowed the fining of non-enrolees (between 5000 and 10,000
RwF, i.e., $6–12). They provided for strong deterrence for ‘any per-
son who incites others to refrain from enrolling into community-
based health insurance scheme’ (i.e., a fine of between 50,000
and 100,000 Rwf).26 Furthermore, the laws stipulated that an indi-
vidual can benefit from health coverage only if all members of his/
her household are enrolled.
This pressure on local officials to maintain high mutuelle mem-
bership has led to the use of swift, and at times harsh, methods,
including, arrest, confiscating livestock, banning entrance to local
markets, or denying administrative documents to the non-
bearers of mutuelle cards.27 In one instance, local officials did not
hesitate to steal money from a community health workers’ coopera-
tive in order to pay for the population’s CBHI and keep the enrolment
rate high.28 Such behaviours are officially forbidden, yet some offi-
cials considered them as inevitable, given the strong pressure they
faced from the centre. As explained by a district vice-mayor, ‘it is
their role in Kigali to get concerned by human rights and stuff like
this. But it is not them on the ground [doing the work]. They don’t
understand that for the peasants, the mutuelle is viewed as a
tax’.29 The pressure is such that some local officials have not hesi-
tated to simply tamper with CBHI enrolment data. A glaring example
of the phenomenon was revealed by the resignation and arrest in
late 2014 and early 2015 of three district mayors and several other
local officials over inflating the CBHI enrolment numbers.30
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also creates less expeditious and more creative strategies. Some
local governments have encouraged the creation of savings associ-
ations (ibimina) to pay their CBHI fees, or pushed agricultural coop-
eratives to pay the CBHI of, or at least lend the required money to,
their members.314. Explaining political commitment to CBHI
4.1. Politics and health coverage expansion
Political settlement analysis is useful to probe into the govern-
ment’s ability to roll-out the scheme. First, the concentration of
horizontal power (i.e., power between elite factions) in the settle-
ment has facilitated centralised decision-making. The MoH led the
reform and was fully supported by the presidency and the Ministry
of Local Government that pushed its agents to maintain high enrol-
ment rates. The legislative branch was also unfaltering in its sup-
port of the CBHI, although harsh implementation could have
been exploited by some politicians to challenge the government.
This is because parties in Rwanda, sometimes described as satel-
lites of the RPF (e.g., Longman, 2011: 40), all belong to the ruling
coalition and never challenge the leadership’s political choices or
ideological preferences. Two ministers of health pivotal in the CBHI
rollout, Vincent Biruta and Jean-Damascène Ntawukuriryayo,
although both members of the PSD party, never sought to distance
themselves from the overarching RPF vision. Acting like tech-
nocrats, they worked in the same line as their RPF predecessors.
Overall, the horizontal concentration of power allowed the govern-
ment to quickly seize on a policy initiative and implement it with-
out engaging in lengthy bargaining in order to secure support. The
alternative discourses regarding CBHI policy choices have come
from donors, not from the political opposition.
Second, the vertical distribution of power in the political settle-
ment, concentrated in the hand of the RPF, has given the party
great autonomy vis-à-vis social demands. It made it easy to main-
tain user fees and to enforce compulsory enrolment. It also enabled
the RPF-led coalition to set CBHI as a redistribution mechanism
between the formal, wealthier and mainly urban sector and the
rural areas. In 2015, the contribution of civil servants’ and mili-
taries’ insurances, along with private health insurances, to the
CBHI has been increased from one to five percent of their revenue.
In this context, the large policy space provided by the nature of
the settlement could be fully used by the RPF regime to deter any
future challenge to its rule. Such deterrence has taken the form of a
legitimation project based on quick socio-economic development.
Securing legitimacy has been a prime concern, given the extraordi-
nary vulnerability of the RPF when it took power in 1994, as men-
tioned above. Providing affordable healthcare can be understood as
part of this strategy. This is especially true as the CBHI is primarily
a tool of development for the informal and mainly rural sector,
where the RPF legitimacy is arguably at its slimmest. While the
rural population is mostly Hutu, the RPF is historically composed
of urban ‘old caseload’ Tutsi returnees who fled the country follow-
ing violence in the 1950s and 1960s. They consequently have few
links with the rural world (Ansoms, 2009: 295). The CBHI can be
interpreted as the broad-base tool to bring development and foster
regime legitimacy in the rural areas. Such tool is especially needed,
given the nature of the settlement. The horizontal concentration of
power means that potential threats to the ruling elite are not in the
form of well identified opposition groups. Given the history of31 Interview with MINALOC high official, Kigali, 4 February 2013; with district vice-
mayor, 12 June 2013. See also ‘Rwanda: How Ibimina spurred health cover remittal’,
The New Times, 3 January 2014.ethnic antagonism, threats are potential, diffuse and posed by the
Hutu rural majority with no recognisable leaders. In such context,
implementing a functioning, broad-based programme of redistri-
bution through subsidised health insurance becomes rational.
The universalism and coverage of the Rwandan CBHI can be inter-
preted as an attempt to creates a de facto triple solidarity able to
build regime legitimacy and contribute to the post-ethnic society
the RPF has been calling for. It creates, first, a solidarity between
people of the same community around the health centre; second,
a solidarity, likely to increase as the economy expands, between
the informal and formal as well as urban and rural sectors; and,
thirdly, and as a result, a national solidarity. In this respect, the
Rwandan case echoes historical attempts of many post-
independence African regimes to decrease ethnic division and fos-
ter national identity through ambitious social policies (Kpessa,
Béland, & Lecours, 2011).
However, such interpretation does not explain the govern-
ment’s condonation of CBHI sometimes harsh implementation,
which created resentment and potentially delegitimised the
scheme. If the goal was the mere satisfaction of the rural mass
for the RPF to maintain its power, why not implement the scheme
with fewer rigours, lower the premium price, or lift user fees? One
part of the answer lies again in the dominant nature of the political
settlement. It gives the government a long-term horizon, which
allows it to embrace ‘‘social protection policies that may take time
to design and implement, and that deliver benefits in the medium
to long term” as indeed hypothesised by Lavers and Hickey (2015:
10). CBHI, then, is not just about immediate redistribution or con-
tenting people. It is part of a broader legitimation project, requiring
deep transformation and sustained performance, not short-term
unsustainable redistribution exposed to potential reversal. The
RPF, comforted by its hegemony, is consequently ready to adopt
policies requiring unpopular choices such as compulsory enrol-
ment or limited popular management of the scheme. They are, in
its mind, the conditions of a well-functioning and sustainable
health insurance in the long term.
The other, and main, reason why the government has made
some policy choices potentially unpopular is ideological. Other,
potentially more popular, policy options to improve access to
healthcare could have been compatible with the nature of the
Rwandan political settlement. Yet they would not have been com-
patible with the ideas underpinning it.
4.2. Taking ideas seriously
As hypothesised by the second pillar of the theoretical frame-
work, while power dynamics may provide some insights into the
government’s commitment and capacity to promote financial
access to healthcare, a focus on interests alone would under-
explain the CBHI design and expansion. Drawing on the distinction
presented at the beginning, the role of ideas is visible at the level of
paradigms, problem definitions and policy ideas.
CBHI in Rwanda was in part the product of specific paradigms,
i.e., ‘mental roadmap’, of the RPF-led coalition. Three main overar-
ching paradigmatic ideas can be identified. First of all, national
self-reliance was pivotal in the RPF ideology. Such a paradigm tran-
spires in the unfaltering refusal of lifting user fees even partially, as
this was equated, in the minds of officials, to long-run dependency
on the outside world. It features also in the determination to make
the whole population participate financially in the CBHI, either
through compulsory enrolment or through the subsidising of the
scheme by the formal sector. Concerns for self-reliance were also
perceptible in the significant agency of the government in the rela-
tionship with donor, despite their technical expertise and financial
power. The government did not hesitate to oppose them or stop
their activities if they were deemed contrary to its vision.
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of what a ‘good Rwandan’ should be. People should not ‘get any-
thing for free’ in post-1994 Rwanda. Self-reliance applies conse-
quently not only to the nation, but also to the individual. ‘Free
things’ are especially dangerous at the individual level because
they foster a culture of assistance. As summarised by Protais
Musoni, RPF historical figure and former minister of local govern-
ment: ‘free [health]care has never been an option because it makes
people subservient’.32 The importance of this idea was especially
conspicuous when some donors attempted to pay for the CBHI sub-
scription for a large part of the population regardless of their wealth
status and were asked to stop. For the RPF, if they want to get out of
poverty, Rwandans have to play an active role. They especially have
to change their ‘mindset’ and ‘mentality’, an important rhetorical
element in officials’ discourse (e.g. Ansoms, 2009: 298; Gaynor,
2014: S56). The government-aligned New Times identified, for exam-
ple, as an obstacle to CBHI enrolment, ‘poor mentality among former
indigents who graduated from poverty [i.e., moved up in ubudehe cat-
egories] and now have to pay subscription by themselves’.33 The
quote is revealing on how paying CBHI subscription and individual
dependence are opposed in public narratives, and how getting out
of poverty is a ‘graduation’ in life, i.e., the result of an active process.
What matters is not only getting out of poverty, it is also the effort
put into the process itself. Part of the effort is to find the money to
pay for the CBHI premium. Poverty, including poor access to health-
care, is not only envisioned as a trap in which people are caught. It is
also a disease of dependency that compulsory CBHI enrolment can
help fighting.
Third, the adoption of CBHI was, at the beginning, the product of
the RPF’s belief that grassroots democratic participation promotes
reconciliation, ownership and fights ‘the sub culture of passive
obedience which left people open to political and sectarian manip-
ulation’ (MINALOC, 2004: 11). The idea of fostering popular owner-
ship was visible in the MoH’s determination to depart from the
Zambian model of insurance management by health facility staff
and in the introduction of co-management between the population
and civil servants.
The case of CBHI is however hardly the result of policy diffusion.
The Rwandan CBHI model has been largely endogenously designed,
drawing to a limited extent on the Zambian experience of health
prepayment schemes. This is not to say that transnational ideas
did not matter. They did but negatively. The disappointing results
of CBHI schemes in West Africa and of the Burundian Assistance
Health Card were perceived as counter-examples not to follow.
This assessment reinforces the paper’s argument that power and
ideological imperatives are crucial to understand the shape and
implementation of the CBHI. They pushed the government not to
adopt blindly existing models unable to match its ideological
preferences and concerns for the sustainability of the policy.
How ideas influenced the CBHI design and implementation can
be aptly summarised using the framework presented in the intro-
duction. Ideas at the paradigmatic level then shaped ideas at the
level of problem and policy definition, which in turn gave its form
to the CBHI. These ideas were both normative, stating what is good
or bad and how the world should be, and cognitive, acting like a
prism through which issues were understood and addressed
(Table 2).
Overall, CBHI was the policy solution to lower financial barriers
to healthcare that was best suited for a certain distribution of
power in the polity and fitted the regime ideas. Taking ideas seri-
ously explains why the policy could not take alternative forms,
such as tax-based financing, CBHI-cum-lifting user fees or, at least32 Interview with Protais Musoni, Kigali, 20 February 2015.
33 ‘Mutuelle subscription rate at 79%’, The New Times, 12 January 2016.at the beginning, social health insurance (SHI). While the political
settlement might have been compatible with such alternative pol-
icy choices, ideas were not.
Tax-based financing would not have fit with the ideological
emphasis on national and individual self-reliance. It did not
demand the visible contributions of all citizens to healthcare as
money would have been channelled through general taxation
and leaving largely out contributions of individuals working in
the informal economy. Similarly, a model based on CBHI with no
user fee was not appealing because it was perceived as less likely
to contribute financially to national self-reliance and psychologi-
cally to individual self-reliance.
At the beginning, SHI also did not fit rulers’ ideas. It was origi-
nally incompatible with the ideological emphasis on popular man-
agement of health insurance to promote reconciliation and
community ownership. Yet, overtime, CBHI progressively morphed
into a SHI through compulsory enrolment and the professionaliza-
tion of CBHI management. This is because not all paradigmatic
ideas have retained their power over time. Tension has arisen
between the original idea of popular ownership, and the ideologi-
cal project of national and individual self-reliance that made
mandatory enrolment a necessity in the eyes of the regime. Fur-
thermore, the idea of popular ownership could not resist the pres-
sure to quickly expand and streamline the scheme for legitimation
purposes, which required compulsory enrolment, professional
staffing, cross-subsidy, and increasing the national pooling of
resources. These measures helped to avoid poor management,
adverse selection, fragmented, small risk pooling, which are the
most common cause of failure of CBHI schemes (Carrin,
Waelkens, & Criel, 2005; De Allegri et al., 2009). As a result, from
a collection of a ‘pure’ form of voluntary CBHI schemes, the govern-
ment has effectively built what now looks like a SHI. Yet, the trace
of the paradigmatic idea of popular ownership is still visible in the
reluctance of government officials to acknowledge this evolution to
researchers and in the very maintenance of the name ‘CBHI.’4.3. Competing explanations
The demonstration needs finally to be confronted with some
competing explanations for the success of CBHI expansion. The
first is related to geography. Rwanda’s small size and high popula-
tion density, one of the highest on the continent, could be the main
factor behind the CBHI successful scale-up. It undoubtedly eased
the process by facilitating the sensitization of individuals and the
control of their enrolment. However, this was only a contributory
factor, but not a necessary condition. Burundi is a country of sim-
ilar size and population density but has not reached the same level
of enrolment into its health insurance scheme (Table 1 above).
Conversely, enrolment in the new health insurance programme
in Ethiopia is extremely fast although the country is not densely
populated (Lavers, 2016). The analysis instead demonstrates that
the first main necessary condition for the rapid scale-up of CBHI
in Rwanda was the top-down pressure put on the local authorities,
underpinned by the nature of the political settlement.
A second competing explanation of the CBHI rapid expansion
may lie in the homogeneity of its population in terms of language
and ethnic composition, traits normally associated with better
public good provision (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Miguel &
Gugerty, 2005). This is however questionable. Studies have showed
that, more than the ethnic diversity per se, it is the lack of trust and
cooperation between ethnic groups that may hinder provision of
public goods (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein,
2007), something arguably significant in post genocide Rwanda.
Furthermore, recent research reveals that the relationship between
ethnic homogeneity and increased public goods provision may not
Table 2
Community-based health insurance and ideas.
Level of idea Type of idea Ideas relevant to CBHI
Paradigmatic ideas Normative  Rapid socioeconomic development is good for regime legitimation
 Rwanda should be self-reliant
Cognitive  The role of the state is to mobilise all resources and individuals in the pursuit of socio-economic progress
 It is the role of the state to decrease the dependency on the external world
Problem definition Normative  Access to healthcare should be affordable in order not to obstruct socio-economic development
 Health financing should not be dependent on donors’ money in the long run.
Cognitive  A popular mentality of passivity and dependency holds Rwanda back
 Financial resources from the state and the population are not fully harnessed to lower financial barriers to healthcare
 Extracting financial resources from the population is a good tool to inculcate a sense of individual self-reliance
Policy ideas Normative  Healthcare should be accessible for all
 The state, the private sector and any able individual should contribute money
Cognitive  Out-of-pocket expenditure is limited by pre-payment and risk pooling
 CBHI cost is shared between the state and the beneficiaries, and subsidised by the formal sector
 CBHI is compulsory
 CBHI is managed by professionals, not by the population
Source: Based on the typology in Lavers and Hickey (2015).
34 The case of Ethiopia seems for example to support the hypothesis that dominant
political settlements are conducive to the pursuit of UHC. While Ethiopia recently
embarked on this journey, it has made extremely rapid progress in terms of
enrolment. See Lavers (2016).
96 B. Chemouni /World Development 106 (2018) 87–98be as strong as previously thought (Gibson and Hoffman, 2013,
Gisselquist, Leiderer, & Niño-Zarazúa, 2016).
A third alternative explanation to Rwanda’s success may be that
it is historically recognised as an orderly country with a tradition of
state effectiveness (Prunier, 1998). While this may ease CBHI roll-
out, such argument cannot explain the difficult political decision to
adopt the policy in the first place and the significant pressure put
on local officials to implement it.
A last competing explanation lies in the status of donor darling
of Rwanda. While donors’ funds played a key role in the expansion
of CBHI, the analysis shows that this has been primarily thanks to
the demand side (the Rwandan government) rather than the sup-
ply side (the donor) of aid. The initial pilot originated in the MoH
decision to approach USAID for technical and financial support,
not the other way around. The scale-up of the scheme was made
possible because Rwanda was able to convincingly argue to the
GFTAM to fund the CBHI through a ‘‘Health System Strengthening”
grant. Money was poured into the scheme because it was recog-
nised as well managed by the government, notably because the
dominant character of the political settlement made clientelism
unnecessary. Consequently, in the case of CBHI, the status of aid
darling was largely created by the Rwandan government. It was
not an exogenous factor to the demonstration.
5. Conclusion
The contribution of this article is twofold. The main one is
empirical. It explains from a political standpoint the exceptional
case of Rwanda, which achieved the highest health insurance
enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, it used a theoretical
framework focusing on power and ideas to shed light on why the
CBHI took the shape it did, and why it was successfully scaled-
up. The nature of the Rwandan political settlement made
approaches to healthcare financing focused on immediate political
gain unnecessary for regime maintenance. The space provided by
the settlement meant that the government could roll out a
broad-based programme, adapt it quickly to emerging problems,
and take difficult political choices to ensure sustainability. How-
ever, the nature of the political settlement is not enough to under-
stand why the government chose compulsory CBHI to expand
access to healthcare. Other solutions, sometimes advocated by
donors, such as general tax-financing or CBHI coupled with lifting
of user fees, were also compatible with the political settlement. Yet
these alternative policies did not fit with the RPF ideas as well as
the CBHI solution did. The same political settlement, but with dif-
ferent ideas, would have probably resulted in another form ofsocial protection in the health sector. Ideas also had an effect on
how the scheme was implemented. The idea that high enrolment
was the condition for national and individual self-reliance explains
the increasingly state-led, top down implementation of the CBHI
policy. Besides power, ideas mattered. This article consequently
echoes the ‘‘ideational turn” (Blyth, 1997) in political science that
has reaffirmed the role of ideas in political processes, criticising
explanations solely based on ‘‘objective” interests (Béland & Cox,
2011). Ideas are also mental models through which interests are
identified and constructed (Hay, 2011).
The second contribution of the article is to inform the debate on
how to reach universal health coverage in poor countries. Obvi-
ously, the Rwandan CBHI model may not be fully reproducible. It
is the result of a particular political and ideological landscape.
Yet, the Rwandan case highlights the importance of two key vari-
ables in the pursuit of universal health coverage in a context of
poverty and limited state capacity: distribution of power in the
polity and ideas.34 The implication for donors is that, when deciding
to allocate funds to social protection, political economy analysis is
key to assess pattern of decision-making, potential spoilers, clien-
telist pressure, and ultimately the regime’s commitment to provide
sustainable solutions. The article also highlights the centrality of
ideas in the pursuit of universal health coverage. Practically, this
means that donors’ careful analysis of ideas underpinning ruling
coalition is essential. Programme design incompatible with ideas of
the regime may undermine countries’ commitment to the pro-
gramme or simply create political push-back, as showed spectacu-
larly in Rwanda when the government directly opposed donors.
The Rwandan case also informs the debate on the relevance of ‘‘pure”
CBHI models, based on voluntary enrolment and community man-
agement, for poor countries in the pursuit of universal health cover-
age. Although fashionable, their incapacity to ensure high enrolment,
a large pool of risk and professional management while limiting
adverse selection questions their capacity to bring about universal
health coverage (Carrin et al., 2005; De Allegri et al., 2009). The
Rwandan experience shows that large and sustainable health insur-
ance coverage is hardly possible without a significant tax and/or
donor support, especially to subsidise the poorest populations (see
also Kutzin, 2012; Lagomarsino, Garabrant, Adyas, Muga, & Otoo,
2012). Consequently, donors need to accept that advocating for uni-
versal health coverage in poor countries might be futile unless they
B. Chemouni /World Development 106 (2018) 87–98 97are ready, as the GFTAM in Rwanda, to pour significant funds
through country systems over an extended period. This is never easy,
as showed by the tension that the GFTAM money created between
the donors and the Rwandan government about its management.
Unfortunately, this will be increasingly difficult given the recent evo-
lution of the aid landscape. The decreasing donors’ commitment to
the 2005 Paris Declaration, and its principles of aligning funding
with recipient countries’ priorities, makes budget support and
respect for countries’ paradigmatic ideas, less likely. The Rwandan
case also questions the viability of a CBHI model based on commu-
nity management. Any large pool of money requires strong manage-
ment and monitoring skills that community-centred initiatives may
not provide. In Rwanda, this was solved at the expense of popular
participation.
Furthermore, the Rwandan experience spotlights the difficulties
of increasing enrolment. The rise of welfare state in Europe has
been facilitated by the formalisation of the economy that eased
taxation or compulsory enrolment in SHI through payroll deduc-
tion. Such an evolution is more difficult in Sub-Saharan Africa
given the size of the informal sector. Nonetheless, historical evi-
dence suggests that ‘‘no country has attained universal population
coverage by relying mainly on voluntary contributions to insur-
ance schemes.” (Kutzin, 2012: 867; Savedoff, de Ferranti, Smith,
& Fan, 2012). Voluntary enrolment in fragmented insurance
schemes might only be an initial first step, but it is not sustainable
in the long run. Yet, for poor countries, while tax-financed health
care is difficult with a limited tax base, enforcing mandatory enrol-
ment is not only practically complicated with a large informal sec-
tor, it is also politically difficult. The Rwandan authoritarian
approach, made possible by the nature of its political settlement,
might be hardly transferable and perhaps desirable. Future analy-
sis of the recent National Insurance Act passed in September 2017
in Nepal, a country with political settlements and elite’s ideas
markedly different from Rwanda, will be useful as it bears strong
resemblances with the Rwandan policy: enrolment to the national
health insurance is compulsory and coupled with out-of-pocket
premiums, which are subsidised for the poor. In any case, the
Rwandan experience is a powerful call for thinking harder on ways
to improve enrolment, for example through innovative financing
mechanisms such as saving associations to pay premiums or large
donor funding, or through improving the quality of care. It also fur-
ther highlights that myriad of independent, low enrolment, CBHI
schemes, will probably not be enough to pursue universal health
coverage.Conflict of interest
None.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the Effective States and Inclusive
Development (ESID) Research Centre at the University of
Manchester through a DFID grant. I thank Tom Lavers for his
comments and guidance, Hinda Ruton for his research assistance,
Pia Schneider, Philipa Mladovsky and the anonymous reviewers
for their useful comments.
References
Abt Associates/USAID (2014). Final report: Health systems 20/20 Namibia project.
Bethesda: Abt Associates.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1243–1284.
Ansoms, A. (2009). Re-engineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of the
Rwandan elite. African Affairs, 108(431), 289–309.Appiah, B. (2012). Universal health coverage still rare in Africa. Canadian Medical
Association Journal, 184(2), E125–E126.
Atim, C. (1998). The contribution of mutual Health organizations to financing, delivery,
and access to health care: Synthesis of research in nine West and Central African
Countries Technical Report No. 18. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health
Reform Project, Abt Associates.
Barrientos, A., & Pellissery, S. (2012). Delivering effective social assistance: Does
politics matter? ESID Working Paper. No. 9.
Béland, D. (2005). Ideas and social policy: An institutionalist perspective. Social
Policy & Administration, 39(1), 1–18.
Béland, D., & Cox, R. H. (Eds.). (2011). Ideas and politics in social science research.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beswick, D. (2010). Managing dissent in a post-genocide environment: The
challenge of political space in Rwanda. Development and Change, 41(2), 225–251.
Blyth, M. (1997). ‘Any more bright ideas?’ The ideational turn in comparative
political economy”. Comparative Politics, 29(1), 229–250.
Carrin, G., Waelkens, M. P., & Criel, B. (2005). Community-based health insurance in
developing countries: A study of its contribution to the performance of health
financing systems. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 10(8), 799–811.
CCM Rwanda (2005). Assuring access to quality care: The missing link to combat AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. Kigali: Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM)
Rwanda.
Chemouni, B. (2014). Explaining the design of the Rwandan decentralization: Elite
vulnerability and the territorial repartition of power. Journal of Eastern African
Studies, 8(2), 246–262.
De Allegri, M., Sauerborn, R., Kouyaté, B., & Flessa, S. (2009). Community health
insurance in sub-Saharan Africa: What operational difficulties hamper its
successful development? Tropical Medicine & International Health, 14(5),
586–596.
Di John, J., & Putzel, J. (2009). Political settlements Issues Papers. Birmingham, UK:
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.
Dror, D. M., & Jacquier, C. (1999). Micro-insurance: Extending health insurance to
the excluded. International Social Security Review, 52(1), 71–97.
Dutta, A., & Hongoro, C. (2013). Scaling up national health insurance in Nigeria:
Learning from case studies of India, Colombia, and Thailand. Washington, DC:
Futures Group, Health Policy Project.
Gaynor, N. (2014). ‘‘A nation in a hurry”: The costs of local governance reforms in
Rwanda. Review of African Political Economy, 41(Suppl. 1), S49–S63.
George, A., & Bennett, A. (2004). Case studies and theory development in the social
sciences. Cambridge, MA; London: MIT.
George, A., & McKeown, T. (1985). Case studies and theories of organizational
decision making. In R. Coulam & R. Smith (Eds.), Advances in information
processing in organizations (pp. 43–68). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Gibson, C. C., & Hoffman, B. D. (2013). Coalitions not conflicts: Ethnicity, political
institutions, and expenditure in Africa. Comparative Politics, 45(3), 273–290.
Gisselquist, R. M., Leiderer, S., & Niño-Zarazúa, M. (2016). Ethnic heterogeneity and
public goods provision in Zambia: Evidence of a subnational ‘‘diversity
dividend”. World Development, 78, 308–323.
Gökgür, N. (2012). Rwanda’s ruling party-owned enterprises: Do they enhance or
impede development? IOB Discussion Paper. 2012.03.
Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2013). Politics, political settlements and social change in post-
colonial Rwanda ESID Working Paper 24. Manchester: The University of
Manchester.
Graham, C. (1995). The politics of safety nets. Journal of Democracy, 6(2), 142–156.
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does
ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political Science
Review, 101(4), 709–725.
Hay, C. (2011). Ideas and the construction of interests. In D. Béland & R. H. Cox
(Eds.), Ideas and politics in social science research (pp. 65–82). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hsiao, W. C. (2001). Unmet health needs of two billion: Is community financing a
solution? World Bank, HNP Discussion Paper.
Huber, E., & Stephens, J. D. (2001). Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties
and policies in global markets. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Jehu-Appiah, C., Aryeetey, G., Spaan, E., De Hoop, T., Agyepong, I., & Baltussen, R.
(2011). Equity aspects of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana: Who
is enrolling, who is not and why. Social Science & Medicine, 72(2), 157–165.
Kalavakonda, V., Groos, N., & Karasi, J.-C. (2007). Mid-term evaluation of the Global
Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) 5th round project on
health systems strengthening: Assuring access to quality care: The missing link to
combat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in Rwanda. Geneva: The Global Fund.
Kalk, A., Groos, N., Karasi, J. C., & Girrbach, E. (2010). Health systems strengthening
through insurance subsidies: The GFATM experience in Rwanda. Tropical
Medicine & International Health, 15(1), 94–97.
Khan, M. (2010). Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing
institutions (Unpublished manuscript).
Korpi, W. (1978). The working class in welfare capitalism: Work, unions and politics in
Sweden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Kpessa, M., Béland, D., & Lecours, A. (2011). Nationalism, development, and social
policy: The politics of nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 34(12), 2115–2133.
Kusi, A., Enemark, U., Hansen, K. S., & Asante, F. A. (2015). Refusal to enrol in Ghana’s
National Health Insurance Scheme: is affordability the problem? International
Journal for Equity in Health, 14(2).
Kutzin, J. (2012). Anything goes on the path to universal health coverage? No.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 90(11), 867–868.
98 B. Chemouni /World Development 106 (2018) 87–98Lagomarsino, G., Garabrant, A., Adyas, A., Muga, R., & Otoo, N. (2012). Moving
towards universal health coverage: Health insurance reforms in nine
developing countries in Africa and Asia. The Lancet, 380(9845), 933–943.
Lavers, T. (2016). Social protection in an aspiring ‘developmental state’: The political
drivers of Community-Based Health Insurance in Ethiopia ESID Working Paper No.
71. Manchester, UK: The University of Manchester.
Lavers, T., & Hickey, S. (2015). Investigating the political economy of social protection
expansion in Africa: At the intersection of transnational ideas and domestic politics
ESID Working Paper 47. Manchester: The University of Manchester.
Longman, T. (2011). Limitations to political reform. In S. Straus & L. Waldorf (Eds.),
Remaking Rwanda: State building and human rights after mass violence
(pp. 25–47). Madison, WI: University of Wiscons. in press.
Lu, C., Chin, B., Lewandowski, J. L., Basinga, P., Hirschhorn, L. R., Hill, K., ...
Binagwaho, A. (2012). Towards universal health coverage: An evaluation of
Rwanda Mutuelles in its first eight years. PLoS One, 7(6), e39282.
Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and
results. European Journal of Sociology, 25(02), 185–213.
Miguel, E., & Gugerty, M. K. (2005). Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public
goods in Kenya. Journal of Public Economics, 89(11), 2325–2368.
Mills, A., Ally, M., Goudge, J., Gyapong, J., & Mtei, G. (2012). Progress towards
universal coverage: The health systems of Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania.
Health Policy and Planning, 27(Suppl. 1), i4–i12.
MINALOC (2004). Rwanda five-year decentralization implementation program. Kigali:
Ministry of Local Government, Republic of Rwanda.
Ministère de la Santé (2015). Manuel de procédures pour la mise en œuvre de la carte
d’assistance médicale au Burundi – CAM 2015. Bujumbura: République du
Burundi.
Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action social (n.d.). Aide memoire sur la couverture
maladie universelle. Dakar: République du Sénégal.
MoH (2004). Politique de Développement des Mutuelles de Santé au Rwanda. Kigali:
Ministry of Health.
MoH of Kenya (2014). 2013 Kenya Household Health Expenditure and Utilisation
Survey. Nairobi: Government of Kenya.
Musango, L. (2005). Organisation et mise en place de mutuelles. Défi au développement
de l’assurance maladie au Rwanda (Ph.D. thesis). Brussels: Université Libre de
Belgique.
Musango, L., Doetinchem, O., & Carrin, G. (2009). De la mutualisation du risque
maladie à l’assurance universelle: expérience du Rwanda Discussion paper 1/2009.
Geneva: World Health Organisation.
Ndiaye, P., Soors, W., & Criel, B. (2007). Editorial: A view from beneath: Community
health insurance in Africa. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 12(2),
157–161.
NHIA (2014). National health insurance authority 2013 annual report. Accra: NHIA.
NISR MoH & ICF International (2015). Rwanda demographic and health survey 2014–
15. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), Ministry of
Health, and ICF International.
Nzisabira, J. (1992). Les organisations populaires du Rwanda: Leur émergence, leur
nature et leur évolution. Bulletin de l’APAD, 4.
OAG (2011). Value for money audit report of mutual health insurance scheme
(Mutuelles de Santé) for the period 2009–2010. Kigali: Office of the Auditor
General.
Odeyemi, I. A. (2014). Community-based health insurance programmes and the
national health insurance scheme of Nigeria: Challenges to uptake and
integration. International Journal for Equity in Health, 13(20).Preker, A., & Carrin, G. (2004). Health financing for poor people: Resource mobilization
and Rsk sharing. Washington DC: World Bank.
Preker, A., Carrin, G., Dror, D., Jakab, M., Hsiao, W., & Arhin-Tenkorang, D. (2004).
Rich-poor differences in health care financing. In A. Preker & G. Carrin (Eds.),
Health financing for poor people: Resource mobilization and risk sharing
(pp. 3–52). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Prunier, G. (1998). The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide. London: Hurst Publishers.
Republic of South Africa (2014). Twenty-year review: South Africa 1994–2014.
Pretoria: The Presidency.
Reyntjens, F. (2013). Political governance in post-genocide Rwanda. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ridde, V., Robert, E., & Meessen, B. (2010). Les pressions exercées l’abolition du
paiement des soins sur les systèmes de santé World Health Report: Background
paper 43. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Sabates-Wheeler, R., Yates, S., Wylde, E., & Gatsinzi, J. (2015). Challenges of
measuring graduation in Rwanda. IDS Bulletin, 46(2), 103–114.
Saksena, P., Antunes, A. F., Xu, K., Musango, L., & Carrin, G. (2011). Mutual health
insurance in Rwanda: Evidence on access to care and financial risk protection.
Health Policy, 99(3), 203–209.
Saleh, K., Barroy, H., & Couttolenc, B. (2014). Health financing in the Republic of
Gabon. A World Bank study. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Savedoff, W. D., de Ferranti, D., Smith, A. L., & Fan, V. (2012). Political and economic
aspects of the transition to universal health coverage. The Lancet, 380(9845),
924–932.
Schmidt, V. A. (2002). Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state
adjustment? Comparative Political Studies, 35(2), 168–193.
Schmidt, V. (2008). Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and
discourse. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 303–326.
Schneider, P., & Diop, F. (2001). Synopsis of results on the impact of community-based
health insurance on financial accessibility to health care in Rwanda HNP
Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Schneider, P., Diop, F., & Bucyana, S. (2000a). Development and Implementation of
Prepayment Schemes in Rwanda Technical Report 45. Bethesda, MD:
Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates.
Schneider, P., Nandakumar, A. K., Porignon, D., Bhawalkar, M., Butera, D., & Barnett,
C. (2000b). Rwanda National Health Accounts 1998. Technical Report 53.
Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates.
SHOPS Project (2014). Botswana Private Health Sector Assessment. Brief. Bethesda,
MD: Strengthening Health Outcomes through the Private Sector Project, Abt
Associates.
Soors, W., Devadasan, N., Durairaj, V., & Criel, B. (2010). Community health insurance
and universal coverage: Multiple paths, many rivers to crossWorld Health Report:
Background paper 48. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Wang, W., Temsah, G., & Mallick, L. (2017). The impact of health insurance on
maternal health care utilization: Evidence from Ghana, Indonesia and Rwanda.
Health Policy and Planning, 32(3), 366–375.
Weyland, K. (2009). Bounded rationality and policy diffusion: Social sector reform in
Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
WHO (2009). Republic of Rwanda health financing systems review 2008: Options for
universal coverage. Geneva: World Health Organization.
WHO (2010). The World Health Report 2010: Health systems financing. The path to
universal coverage. Geneva: World Health Organization.
